国际碳减排活动中的利益博弈和中国策略的思考  

The Games of All Interest Groups Around the World in Carbon Emission Reduction and Some Discussions on China's Strategies

作　　者：李海涛[1] 许学工[1] 刘文政[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学资源与环境地理系 [2]山东师范大学山东省可持续发展研究中心,山东济南250014

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2006年第5期93-97,共5页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：中国科学院知识创新重大项目(KZCX1-SW-01-18)资助

摘　　要：博弈论能够解释许多经济活动和国际关系中出现的现象和问题。利用博弈论的相关理论,对《京都议定书》各利益集团之间的利益争斗进行了分析,指出各利益集团之间斗争的内在原因,并对中国在新一轮谈判中的策略提出了一些建议:由于《京都议定书》生效,而美国仍拒绝批准《京都议定书》,并同时抛出自己的减排方案,这必然会引起新一轮的减排博弈。面对美国等一些国家施加的压力,中国在这场新的博弈中要有所准备,提出具有建设性的建议和意见,既要维护中国和大多数发展中国家的利益,又要有助于减排。Games theory can explain some phenomena and problems in economic activities and international relationship. This paper tries to use games theory to explain some contents between all interest groups in ＂Kyoto Protocol＂ and points out the causations of their contention. In the end, this paper advances some proposals to China in the next round negotiation： Although ＂Kyoto Protocol＂ has gone into effect, America still refused to receive it and advanced its carbon emission reduction plan. This would cause a new round game. Faced with pressures coming from American and some other developed countries, China should be ready to advance its proposal. This proposal should have some new ideas that should not only protect the interest of China and most developing countries but also be helpful to carbon emission reduction.

关 键 词：博弈论 碳减排 《京都议定书》 对策 

分 类 号：X24[环境科学与工程—环境科学]