交易成本条件下初始排污权免费分配的决策机制  

Free Allocation Mechanism of Initial Emissions Permits in the Condition of Transaction Cost

作　　者：李寿德[1] 黄桐城[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程理论方法应用》2006年第4期318-322,共5页Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(7027302170573073);国家社会科学基金资助项目(03BJY040)

摘　　要：初始排污权的分配问题不但是组建排污权交易市场的起点和基础,而且是排污权交易中争议最大和最困难的问题。目前,初始排污权的分配方式主要有免费分配和有偿分配两类。根据机制设计原理,建立了交易成本条件下使期望社会福利最大化的初始排污权免费分配模型,并分析了免费分配的决策机制问题。Tradable emission permits is an economic instrument used to attain a predetermined level of environmental quality. The basic concept behind emission trading, originated by Dales, is a simple one. Initially, a regulatory agency limits the overall level of emissions, either by setting a standard or allocating emission, and then it allows firms to trade their emission allocations or surplus permits. It is now widely agreed among economists that marketable emission permits can be a cost-effective strategy for controlling environmental pollutants, and an extensive literature on their properties has developed. In this paper, we research the initial emissions permits allocation mechanism in the condition of transaction cost.

关 键 词：初始排污权 交易成本 分配机制 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]