供应链管理中信息共享机制的探讨  

The Information Sharing in Supply Chain with Two Firms Possessing Private Information

作　　者：王子萍[1] 黄培清[1] 葛静燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2006年第9期1561-1565,1571,共6页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20020248011)

摘　　要：针对博弈双方均拥有私有信息环境下已有研究的局限性,从全新的重复博弈角度切入,并辅以信息期望收益的概念建立数量模型,对供应链中成员双方均具有私有信息的情况进行了详细讨论.给出了影响双方进行策略选择的驱动力以及相应的系统参数范围,分析了共享信息作为均衡策略的可能性.Signaling and screening, as two helpful tools, have been used to make information sharing realized. However, when two firms in supply chain both have private information and no one has superior information, signaling and screening can not make much contribution to that case. So one new repeated game model was proposed, which is effective to discuss the possibility of sharing information between two firms both possessing private information. Also the range of system parameter which can trigger information sharing was highlighted.

关 键 词：信息共享 重复博弈 博弈论 信号传递 信号甄别 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]