电力市场中差价合约的合谋效应  

The Collusion Effect of Contracts for Differences in the Electricity Market

作　　者：叶泽[1] 喻苗[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学管理学院,湖南长沙410076

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第3期67-70,共4页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"电力市场条件下电力工业投资均衡机制及相关政策研究"(批准号:70473008);湖南省教育厅重点科研项目"放松管制后电力工业投资均衡机制研究"(批准号:04A003)

摘　　要：电力市场条件下,各发电企业的电力同时通过实时市场和能回避实时电价波动风险的中远期合约市场进行销售。差价合约是重要的中远期合约。本文通过一个古诺双寡头模型分析了差价合约对厂商市场行为的影响。研究表明,在一个时期内,电力市场中的差价合约降低了发电厂商提高实时电价的激励,也降低了发电厂商的利润,提高了市场运行的效率;但在一个无限重复博弈的动态环境中,差价合约促进了发电厂商之间的合谋,损害了竞争。管制机构可以通过限定最小差价合约电量消除差价合约的合谋效应。In the electricity market, electricity is sold simultaneously through spot market, metaphase and long-term contracts. Contracts for differences axe important metaphase and long-term contracts. This paper analyses the influence of contracts for differences upon the market for the manufacturers through a Cournot model. It concludes that in a certain period of time, contracts for differences of the electricity market bring down the profit of the firms as well as cancel the stimulating policies aiming at the improvement of spot electric prices of the firms, thus help to improve the efficiency of the market. However, in the dynamic environment of infinite repeated game, contracts for differences accelerate the collusion of a couple of firms, and thus render the market less competitive. The regulation organization can eliminate the collusion effect by placing the limit of minimum in the contract for differences.

关 键 词：电力市场 差价合约 合谋 管制 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]