设计有效的经营者持股激励机制——基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

Design for the Effective Mechanism of Managerial Stock Ownership An Empirical Research Based on Listed Companies in China

作　　者：胡阳[1] 刘志远[1] 任美琴 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院 [2]不详

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2006年第5期52-58,82,共8页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(20052164);天津市2005年重点会计科研项目(KJKYXM050101)的资助

摘　　要：本文从企业财务控制系统设计的角度对上市公司经营者持股问题进行了实证研究。通过考察实施经营者持股激励制度的我国A股上市公司2002年到2004年的业绩,本文发现,经营者持股金额与经营者年薪金额的比例是衡量持股激励强度的有效指标,该指标与股票报酬率呈线性正相关关系,与会计利润指标没有正相关关系。在上述公司中,董事长和总经理持股数量多的、高成长性的公司提高(长期)股票报酬率的效果更加明显。同时,本文的实证结果说明:如果持股数量能对经营者(特别是董事长和总经理)的个人利益有充分影响,经营者持股激励制度会以较低的成本达到较好的效果(公司股票报酬率显著较高)。Based on the management control systems design, the paper conducts an empirical research on incentive mechanism of managerial stock ownership in listed companies. By investigating listed companies who implemented incentive mechanism of managerial stock ownership in 2002 in China, the paper finds that both the stock return and accounting profit are higher than the industry median level in these companies. In addition, the companies enjoy significantly higher stock return instead of accounting profit, which have high ownership multiples （stock value divided by salary） and high ownership by general managers and Board chairmen. The paper shows that if the managerial stock ownership could have impact on the personal interest of managers （especially general managers and Board chairmen）, the incentive mechanism should have good effect （higher stock return） with low cost.

关 键 词：经营者持股 股权激励 财务控制 股票报酬率 权变思想 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]