企业并购的信号博弈分析  

The Analysis of Corporation M&A Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：徐增标[1] 郑垂勇[1] 刘卫国[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学,南京210098

出　　处：《化工技术经济》2006年第10期49-53,共5页Chemical Techno-Economics

摘　　要：并购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动,是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业并购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择,企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态,其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型,提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。The merger and acquisition is an action of property right and a game process in order to pursue both parties＇ maximum interests under market economy. Because of converse choose caused by information asymmetry in M＆A market, the M＆A will appear the following three different market equilibriums, namely separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium, semi-separating equilibrium. Separating equilibrium is the most ideal and efficient equilibrium. A signaling game model between the acquiring firm and the acquired firm is given in this paper. The most effective method of achieving separating equilibrium is to overcome information asymmetry between the acquiring and acquired firm and accurately appraise valuation of acquired firm.

关 键 词：企业并购 决策论 信号博弈 信息不对称 分离均衡 混同均衡 准分离均衡 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]