农产品供应链中生产商深加工博弈分析  

The Game on Deeply Processing in Manufacturers of Agricultural Products' Supply Chain

作　　者：侯云先[1] 韩冰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100094

出　　处：《农业系统科学与综合研究》2006年第4期245-247,251,共4页System Sciemces and Comprehensive Studies In Agriculture

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(05BJY071);欧盟资助项目(Asia ZT81C)

摘　　要：一个供应链的各个环节上的主体都在为实现自身利益最大化进行着博弈。主要针对农产品供应链中生产商就深加工方面的策略选择问题,运用博弈论的基本方法,对完全信息静态下供应链中生产商深加工博弈问题进行了研究。通过建立博弈模型,得出不同情况下的Nash均衡结果和均衡解,并对均衡结果进行灵敏度分析。分析结果表明,生产企业采取不同的策略时,其均衡解与影响均衡结果的因素也不尽相同。图2,参7。The principals in a supply chain compete for maximizing one＇s own interests. This paper mainly discusses the strategy selection on deeply processing in the manufacturers of an agricultural products＇ supply chain. With the game theory, the paper analyzes the static game of deeply processing in the supply chain under complete information. The Nash Equilibriam solutions and results in different situations were found, and the influence factors involved in the model were analyzed. It is obvious from the results that when the manufacturers adopt different strategies, the equilibrium solutions and the influence factors are not so.

关 键 词：生产商 农产品加工 博弈论 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F323.7[经济管理—产业经济]