异质产品供应链定价控制权与零售商横向兼并效应分析  

Research on Pricing Control Power and Retailers' Horizontal Merger Effects in Heterogeneous Products Markets

作　　者：胡义东[1] 钟德强[1] 仲伟俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第4期31-35,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(02JJY5017)

摘　　要：针对一部线性合约与供应商是否具有绝对定价控制权,比较分析零售商横向兼并集中度提高对消费者福利的影响。结果表明,(1)当供应商具有绝对定价控制权时,零售商横向兼并对消费者产生的影响取决于产品替代性程度大小:若替代性程度较高,则将产生有利影响,反之,将产生不利影响;(2)当供应商没有绝对定价控制权时,零售商横向兼并对消费者产生的影响取决于零售商兼并前的相对定价控制权强弱与兼并后的相对定价控制权增幅大小:若零售商在供应链中处于相对弱势地位,且零售商横向兼并使零售商的定价控制权增幅较大,则兼并将对消费者产生有利影响,否则,将对消费者产生不利影响。Aimed at one-part linear contracts and the suppliers who have or haven＇t all pricing control power, we compare and analyze the effect of the increase of concentration of retailers＇ horizontal mergers on customers＇ welfare. The conclusion shows that, （1） when suppliers have all pricing control power, the impact of retailers＇ horizontal merger on customers depends on the degree of product substitution： if the degree of substitution is high, it will have favorable effect on custonrers, otherwise, it will adverse impact on customers; （2） when suppliers have no all pricing control power, the effect of retailers＇ horizontal merger on customers depends on retailers＇ relative pricing control power before merger and the increase in relative pricing control power after merger： if retailers are weaker in the supply chain before merger, and retailers＇ horizontal mergers makes their pricing control power increase greatly, the merger will have favorable effect on customers, otherwise, it will have unfavorable effect on customers.

关 键 词：横向兼并 零售商 一部线性舍约 定价控制权 产品替代性程度 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]