基于委托-代理理论的企业经营者激励研究  

Study on principal-agent incentive model of the managers of state owned enterprises

作　　者：李霞[1] 严广乐[1] 张晓莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《上海理工大学学报》2006年第5期423-426,共4页Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371070)

摘　　要：从博弈的角度分析了我国国有企业所有者和经营者的委托代理关系,构造了一个对企业经营者激励的委托代理模型,并针对信息对称与信息不对称情况进行了分析.在设计企业的委托代理激励合同时,若考虑了对经营者的激励,则政府的风险成本、代理成本均比没有考虑对经营者的激励时的要小.从理论上证明了对企业经营者激励的必要性,为企业经理实行年薪制提供了理论依据.Based on the game theory, the relationship ot principal-agent oetween the government and the managers of state owned enterprises is analysed. A principal-agent incentive model is set up. The symmetric information and asymmetric information are analysed. As a principal-agent mechanism is designed, if incentive for managers in an enterprise is considered the risk costs and agential costs of principal are smaller than that if not considered. It is proved in theory that incentive for managers in an enterprise is necessary and provides a theoretical basis for annual salary system of enterprise.

关 键 词：委托-代理模型 对称信息 激励机制 期望效用 

分 类 号：F244.3[经济管理—劳动经济]