循环经济模式下政府与企业的委托-代理问题  

Principal-Agent Problems of Government and Enterprises with Cycle Economy Pattern

作　　者：张保银[1] 汪波[1] 白彦壮[1] 吴煜[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《天津大学学报》2006年第B06期303-308,共6页Journal of Tianjin University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：天津市社会科学基金(tjw04-bj11).

摘　　要：为了研究政府宏观的循环经济政策和企业的逆向物流战略之间的协调与决策问题,政府通过一定的激励和监督手段来规范企业的环境行为,企业通过努力来获得经济效益和规避环境风险,通过设计二者在信息不对称情况下的委托-代理模型,分析政府和企业如何订立优化合约和政府如何选择有效可行的监督力度．结果表明,信息不对称条件下,企业推行绿色管理模式的努力水平,取决于这种努力能够带来的经济效益、环境效益和环境风险所构成的综合效益与努力成本之间的比值,企业的代理成本取决于努力所带来的企业效益和环境效益的比值．To coordinate the relationship between the maeroseopieal cycle economy policy of government and the reverse logistics strategy of enterprise, government standardizes the enterprises behaviors by encouraging and monitoring, while enterprises aim at getting benefit and avoiding environment risk. Principal-agent model under asymmetry information is presented, to analyze the optimization contract and monitoring mechanism by government. The result indicates that the degree of green management pattern lies on the ratio of effort cost and benefit integrated by economy benefit, environment benefit and environment risk, and the enterprises agency cost lies on the ratio of enterprises benefit and environment benefit.

关 键 词：逆向物流 委托-代理 激励合约 监督 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]