我国商业银行学生贷款中的“惜贷”问题探讨——以美国联邦家庭教育贷款为参照  

The discussion on credit stinting in running student loans of our country's commercial banks:taking federal family education loan program of U.S. as a reference

作　　者：梁爱华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学教育科学研究院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《高等教育研究》2006年第12期50-54,共5页Journal of Higher Education

基　　金：美国福特基金项目(1045-0963)

摘　　要：我国国家助学贷款供求失衡、贷方“惜贷”现象严重的原因在于利益激励手段单一且强度不足。要解决这一问题,应借鉴美国联邦政府运用担保、建立学生贷款二级市场和支付特别津贴等财政性激励手段,解决放贷资金风险性大、流动性差和获利困难等问题的经验,跳出只在“风险性”上寻找对策的思维定势,围绕贷方利率并结合担保等手段激励贷方放贷。中央政府应是激励贷方的主体。The supply and demand of National Student Loans of China is imbalance, and the phenomenon of credit stinting of the lenders is severe, which lie in the singularity of interest encouragement measures and shortage intension. In order to solve the problem of credit stinting in the loan operation of commercial banks in our country, we should borrow the experience of the American government to build the second class market, etc. we should jump out of the thinking inertia only in the risk to find the countermeasure, and encourage the lenders to lend according to the bank interest combined with guarantee measures. Thereinto, central government should be the main body to encourage the lenders.

关 键 词：国家助学贷款 “惜贷” 政府激励 

分 类 号：G40-054[文化科学—教育学原理]