管理层融资收购与股权激励的实证研究  

The Empirical Research of Managerial Financing and Ownership Incentive

作　　者：申明浩[1] 苏晓华[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2007年第1期80-84,共5页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(05JC630075);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(05300529)

摘　　要：通过对上市公司的实证研究发现,企业财务风险与高管持股倾向存在负的线性关系,高管持股份额与企业激励效果(管理层努力水平)呈非线性关系。在目前我国企业的改制过程中,管理层由于收购资金匮乏,不太可能完全控股企业,所以存在一个现实的次优比例,可以最有效地激发管理层的积极性。It is found out in the resean：h and proved with true examples that popular managers are inclined to pursue control right througn gaining the ownership and there is an evident negative linear relation between finance risk and managerial tendency to have ownership, and nonlinear relation between managerial ownership ＆ incentive perfonnance. Lack of capital to purchase the ownership of State-owned business, the managers can＇ t absolutely control the business,so there is an inferior proportion to hold the ownership which exerts managerial enthusiasm effectively.

关 键 词：财务风险 高管持股 管理层激励 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]