中国企业社会责任博弈分析  

Games Analysis on the Social Responsibilities of China Firms

作　　者：杜兰英[1] 杨春方[1] 吴水兰[1] 石永东[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2007年第1期95-98,共4页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文通过企业、政府、社会利益博弈分析指出,如果没有中央政府的监管,企业与地方政府必然从自身利益最大化出发,做出有损于社会的行为。如果中央政府对企业社会责任治理策略进行选择,其最佳策略是加大对地方政府,而不是对企业的监管。The default of corporate social responsibilities has brought increasing concerns.This article analyzes the causes of corporate social responsibility default through examining the interests of firms,government and the society.We point out that firms and local government will maximize their own interests and thus to harm the society without the central government supervision.To resolve the corporate social responsibility problem,a better alternative for the central government is to supervise more severely on local government rather than on firms.

关 键 词：政府 企业 社会责任 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理]