开放系统成本相同企业博弈定价模型  

Game Pricing Model for Enterprises with Open System of Identical Cost

作　　者：李森[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第2期293-296,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家"十五"重点科技攻关项目(2001BA206A-1)

摘　　要：比较了封闭系统竞争博弈价格模型和合作博弈价格模型,得出了竞争博弈的价格低、利润小及合作博弈的价格高、利润大的结论.但在开放系统中,较高价格将产生吸引新投资者进入的风险.引入临界价格概念建立了开放系统博弈价格模型,得出了使企业保持相对较高利润水平又对新投资者没有吸引力的价格.进一步分析了临界价格与进入成本关系,进入成本越大,临界价格越高.算例分析显示了模型的合理性.The paper analyses and compares the competitive game pricing model and cooperative game pricing model, such conclusions are obtained： competitive game is of lower price and less profit, while cooperative game is of higher price, more profit. In open system, however, higher price would lead to the risk of attracting more investors to enter. In addition, the paper introduces the concept of critical price, puts forward the pricing model of game in open market, and calculated the price that could maintain high profit for existing firms but has no attraction for new investors. Furthermore, the relationship between critical price and entry cost is analyzed, i. e. the higher the entry cost is, the higher the critical price is. A numerical example is given to illustrate the model.

关 键 词：开放系统 博弈 价格 临界价格 进入成本 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]