超额雇员、权益代理成本与公司价值——来自国有上市公司的经验证据  

Excess Employment,Equity Agency Cost and Corporate Value——Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies

作　　者：曾庆生[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2007年第1期41-47,共7页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院青苗基金的资助

摘　　要：文章以国有控股上市公司为样本,研究发现超额雇员公司的权益代理成本显著高于非超额雇员公司,同时市场对超额雇员公司价值进行了折价。这表明,当承担社会性负担时,国有控股公司同样面临原国有企业的预算软约束问题。With a sample of state-owned listed companies, this paper found that the equity agency cost of companies with excess employment was higher than those without, and the value of companies with excess employment was discounted by the stock market. The result shows the state-owned companies still faced the same soft constraint problems, when they have to shoulde the social resposibilities.

关 键 词：超额雇员 权益代理成本 tobin’s Q 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]