关于出口企业退税行为的博弈分析  

An analysis on the behavior of an exporter's tax refund by game theory

作　　者：毕蕊[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学财政与公共管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《商业经济》2007年第2期24-26,84,共4页Business & Economy

基　　金：2005年黑龙江省研究生创新基金项目"博弈论在我省税务管理中的应用"的阶段性研究成果(YJSCX2006-68HLJ)

摘　　要：出口企业选择依法退税还是违法骗税受到多种因素的影响。建立税务机关与出口企业之间完全信息动态的无限重复博弈模型,得到子博弈精炼纳什均衡解,进而分析出口企业退税行为选择受到税务机关检查成功的概率、税收机关的检查成本以及骗税额等因素的影响,并提出提高企业依法退税率的政策建议。Many factors decided an exporter to refund or defraud tax. By building a model of a dynamic, infinite repeated game completely informed between the tax authority and the exporter, this paper presents that we can achieve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and draw a conclusion that the choice of behavior of an exporter＇s tax refund is influenced by the inspecting successul probability and cost of the tax authorities as well as by the amount of tax defrauded. In the end, it puts some suggestions to increase the rate of the exporter＇s tax refund legally.

关 键 词：出口退税 无限重复博弈 触发策略 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]