基于无缺陷退货的供应链成本补贴策略  

Supply Chain Effort Cost Subsidy Policy for the Channel With False Failure Returns

作　　者：贾涛[1] 徐渝[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2007年第1期131-136,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：在一个供应商与一个零售商组成的供应链中,讨论了逆向物流中的无缺陷退货问题。无缺陷退货的成本很高,并且都是由供应商承担。为了减少无缺陷退货的数量,需要零售商付出努力,因此供应商应当对零售商的努力成本进行补贴。当零售商的成本可以验证时,证明了成本分担合同可以协调供应链,并且讨论了供应链的利润分配问题;如果零售商的成本不易验证,供应商也可以采用零售努力水平的线性补贴合同达到相同的目的;最后结合数值算例说明了所得结果并分析了渠道内存在Pareto改进的可能性。We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, and the problem of reducing false failure returns in the reverse logistics is discussed. The cost of the false failure returns is significant, and the loss is incurred primarily by the supplier. It is the retailer＇s efforts that can reduce the false failure returns, so the supplier needs to offer a subsidy for the retailer＇s effort costs. If the cost of the retailer＇s effort is verifiable, a supply chain effort sharing contract that can coordinate the channel is presented, and the allocation of channel profit between the supplier and the retailer is also discussed. When the cost of the retailer＇s effort can not be verifiable, a linear subsidy contract for the retailer＇s effort levels can also coordinate the decentralized channel. Finally the results are analyzed by conducting numerical examples to show the conditions for the Pareto--improvement occurs.

关 键 词：运筹学 供应链协调 最优化 逆向物流系统 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]