企业融资中的控制权安排与企业家的激励  

Control Allocation in Firm Financings and Entrepreneur's Incentive

作　　者：燕志雄[1] 费方域[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学经济学院,200052

出　　处：《经济研究》2007年第2期111-123,共13页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：在企业融资中,企业家不仅关心项目的货币收益,而且关心非货币收益,而投资者仅仅关心货币收益。考虑到双方的融资合同是不完全的且企业家受到财富约束,一份初始的激励合同通常无法解决双方存在的潜在利益冲突。作为一个结果,控制权安排(即谁做出关键性决策)是金融合同的一个重要维度。Aghion-Bolton(1992)集中于事后有效率。他们证明了,条件控制在一些环境下是均衡的控制权安排。然而,Hart(2001)提出了一个质疑:他们的模型忽略了一个重要的变量,即努力。通过引入企业家的事前努力,本文解释了为什么控制权在坏状态而不是在好状态转移给投资者。更进一步,本文发现,金融约束的程度大小决定了项目的均衡控制权安排。In firm financings, entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while investor is only concerned about monetary returns. Consider the constraint that the bilateral financial contract is incomplete and entrepreneur is wealth-constrained, an initial incentive contract in general doesn＇t solve their potential interest conflicting. As a result, the allocation of control-who gets to make the critical decisions-is an important dimension of the financial contract. Aghion-Bohon （1992） concentrate on ex post efficiency, they show, contingent control is an equilibrium control allocation in some circumstances. However, Hart（2001） gives a good question： their model ignores an important variable： effort. Through introducing entrepreneur＇s ex ant effort, this paper explains why control shifts to investor in bad state rather than good state. Furthermore, we find out that the extent of financial constraint determines equilibrium control allocation of project.

关 键 词：企业融资 控制权安排 不完全合同 财富约束 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]