生态工业园企业合作非正式契约的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Informal Contacts in Enterprise Cooperation of Eco-industrial Park

作　　者：吴志军[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《经济管理》2007年第4期92-96,共5页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：企业间稳定的合作关系是生态工业园顺利成长的前提条件,要保证这种合作关系就必须有强有力的制度保障。新制度经济学理论提出将长期契约用来代替纵向一体化经营,同时将长期契约分为正式契约和非正式契约。由于正式契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性,提高了它的实施成本,因此,非正式契约在规范园区企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文对防止园区企业机会主义行为的非正式契约进行了博弈分析,着重用不完全信息下的动态博弈理论阐释非正式契约运行的内在机理,并对如何规范园区企业间合作关系提出了建议与对策,以期有助于生态工业园的健康成长。The stable relationship among enterprise cooperation is prerequisite to promote healthy development of ecological industrial park, it is necessary to have strong and effective system guarantee to ensure this relationship of cooperation. The New Institutional Economics theory puts forward the long-term contracts instead of vertical integration, and divides the long-term contracts into formal contacts and informal contacts. Implementing cost of formal contacts has increased as a result of its incompleteness and uncertainty in future, consequently, informal contacts provide strong and effective guarantee to regulate enterprise behaviors in eco-industrial park. This article analyzes informal contracts to prevent from behaviors of opportunism in park with game theory, which emphasize to expound internal mechanism of informal contracts with dynamic game of incomplete information, it brings forward suggestions and countermeasures to regulate relationship among enterprise cooperation in park, and expects that it can contribute to healthy development of eco-industrial park.

关 键 词：生态工业园 非正式契约 博弈 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]