裁员视角下人力资源的有效激励与代理成本分析  

The Design of Efficient Incentives Mechanism and the Analysis of Agency Costs for Human Resource under Layoff

作　　者：雷勇[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第1期25-28,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20020611009);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(02JA790062)

摘　　要：在假定产出可以观测的条件下,构造含裁员概率的企业与员工之间的委托—代理激励模型,把企业的裁员概率与员工的实际业绩结合起来,针对员工素质类型是对称信息和非对称信息,分别探讨含产出—工资合同的企业激励机制设计,比较两种不同信息结构下不同激励效应,分析非对称信息下实施合同的代理成本。Under the condition of the output of employees being measured, the principal-agent incentive models between employee and enterprise are respectively constructed containing the layoff probability related to real achievement of employees, The efficient incentive contracts are put forward according to the complete information or asymmetry information about work effort of employees, which contain the output-wage, Then the different incentive impacts have been compared based on two different information structures, The agency cost has been also discussed under asymmetry information.

关 键 词：信息结构 裁员概率 激励合同 代理成本 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F406.15[经济管理—国民经济]