非此非彼的“客观真实说”与“法律真实说”  

Neither the Theory of Objective Truth Nor the Theory of Legal Truth Is Tenable

作　　者：宋振武[1] 

机构地区：[1]烟台大学法学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《烟台大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第1期33-39,共7页Journal of Yantai University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：诉讼证明的本性及适合于诉讼证明的方法规定了诉讼证明可能达到的程度,此为诉讼证明标准设定的认识论前提。“客观真实说”关于证明标准的观点和关于证明评价标准的观点在诉讼法理上都是不成立的,不具有现实的程序意义。“法律真实”则是个似是而非的概念,“法律真实说”关于真实标准的主张也是多余的。只要承认并对自由心证原则予以纯正把握,则两说及其论争可以终结。The nature and method of judicial proof determines the possible degree that judicial proof may reach, and the standard of judicial proof has robe enacted under this epistemological prerequisite. As the view on the standard of judicial proof and as the view on the criterion of evaluating judicial proof, the theory of objective truth is neither tenable in procedural jurisprudence nor has reality in procedure. The concept of legal truth is a false one that is not tenable, and the proposition of the theory of legal truth on the standard of truth is unnecessary either. Based on the acknowledgement and the perfect interpretation of the principle of free conviction, the two theories and their argument should come to an end.

关 键 词：客观真实 法律真实 证明标准 证明评价标准 自由心证 

分 类 号：D915.3[政治法律—诉讼法学]