上市公司多个大股东并存时的监督与共谋行为博弈分析  

SUPERVISION OR COMPLICITY: WHEN SEVERAL MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS OF LISTED COMPANIES COEXISTENCE

作　　者：倪青山[1] 杨晓萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学统计学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《经济数学》2007年第1期107-110,共4页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：本文通过构建多个大股东并存时的监督与共谋博弈模型,分析发现如果国有股减持后形成国有股、法人股和机构投资者等多个大股东并存的股权结构,在多个大股东并存且达到了混合策略均衡时,有利于上市公司价值的提高,并在一定程度上可以抑制大股东的侵害行为。By constructing game model of several major shareholders which are formation after the reduction of State - owned shares, we round that Ownership Strucaue of several major shareholders coexistence can raise the value of listed companies and inhibit expropriation behavior of the major shareholders when they reached mixed strategy equilibrium.

关 键 词：大股东 博弈分析 混合策略均衡 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]