会计信息与经理人激励契约设计  

Accounting Information and the Design of Managers' Incentive Contract

作　　者：杨德明[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第4期62-66,共5页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70072037)

摘　　要：旨在研究会计信息在经理人激励契约设计中的作用.通过一个委托代理模型分析,分析会计信息与经理人激励契约设计的关系.分析表明,应当允许适度的盈余管理等操纵会计信息的行为,这有助于减少所有者的代理成本.分析还表明,会计信息的可靠性、经理人工作效率,以及经理人风险规避系数等因素均会对会计信息在激励契约中的作用产生影响.In practice, there are so popular to earnings management. But accounting information usually is used to performance evaluation. Our paper use a model of client-agent to analyse the relation between accounting information and the design of managers＇ incentive contracts. The model reveal incentive contracts should permit appropriate managers＇ earnings management. Our paper also show that the reliability of accounting information, efficiency of managers, managers＇ coefficient of risk aversion would affect the operation of accounting information in incentive contracts.

关 键 词：会计信息 盈余管理 业绩评价 激励契约 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]