控制权市场、独立董事制度与监事会治理——基于比较制度分析的视角  

The Market of Corporate Control,Independent Director System and Supervisor Board Governance ——A New View Based on a Comparative Institutional Analysis

作　　者：王世权[1] 刘金岩[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004 [2]山东经济学院工商管理学院,山东济南250011

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2007年第4期71-77,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目"中国民营经济制度创新与发展问题研究"(03JZ00018);国家自然科学基金重点项目"中国公司治理及其评价研究"(项目号为70532001);教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金项目"日中企业集团的比较研究--形成机理;结构特征和机能发挥上的差异与启示";天津社会科学基金资助项目(项目号为TJ03-GL016)

摘　　要：针对近年来理论界对监事会“加强说”和“取消说”的争论,运用比较制度分析方法,分析了我国监事会制度演进过程中的历史路径依赖特征以及控制权市场、独立董事与监事会制度之间的互补关系,并基于现阶段我国控制权市场的不完备性和独立董事制度存在“独立性悖论”的现实,阐明了加强监事会治理的必要性,提出了以完善监事会制度为突破口来带动中国上市公司治理结构整体优化的建议。Focusing on the arguement between ＂reinforcement theory＂ and the ＂rejection theory＂ of supervisor board in recent years, this paper makes an analysis of the characer of historical-path dependency in the process of the supervisor board system in our country, the market of corporate control and the complementary relationship between independent director system and supervisor board system. And this paper also demonstrates the necessity to reinforce the supervisor board governance by basing on the fact of the imperfection in the market for corporate control of our country nowadays and the ＂independence paradox＂ that existed in the independent director system. Finally, the paper presents a suggestion to complete the supervisor board system can open the way for generally enhancing the governance structure of Chinese listed companies.

关 键 词：独立董事 监事会 公司治理 比较制度分析 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]