国家助学贷款政策的制度性缺陷及其改进  

The Institutional Defect of China's National Student Loan Policy and Its Improvement

作　　者：李旭萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]五邑大学财务处,广东江门529020

出　　处：《五邑大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第2期71-74,78,共5页Journal of Wuyi University(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：我国国家助学贷款风险大、执行难的根本原因在于现行助学贷款政策未能建立有效的目标导向机制及合理的风险分担机制。有效的目标导向机制应有助于银行商业目标的实现和各种金融手段的充分利用;合理的风险分担机制要求按照“谁受益谁付费”原则,由助学贷款相关各方共同承担责任,合力规避贷款风险。The fundamental cause of the oversize risks and ineffective implementation of China＇s national student loan policy lies in the absence of an effective goal-oriented mechanism and a rational risk-sharing mechanism. An effective goal-oriented mechanism serves to achieve the commercial goals of banks and enable them to fully utilize all kinds of financial means. A rational risk-sharing mechanism requires that all parties involved in a student loan scheme assume jointly the responsibility and avert the risks in accordance with the principle of ＂he who benefits pays＂.

关 键 词：国家助学贷款 目标导向机制 风险分担机制 

分 类 号：F830.589[经济管理—金融学]