政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究  

Political Patronage and Privatization:Evidence from China's Collectively-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：杨治[1] 路江涌[2] 陶志刚[3] 

机构地区：[1]香港大学商学院 [2]清华大学企业战略与政策系 [3]香港大学经济及工商管理学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2007年第5期104-114,共11页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：清华大学中国与世界经济研究中心研究基金的支持

摘　　要：公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。Political patronage theory of public ownership is based on the premise that governments or government of ficials derive political benefits （local employment, taxes and profits, and private benefits） from the continuing existence of public ownership entities. This theory has predictions on the types of public ownership entities to be privatized first. Using a large sample of China＇s collectively-owned enterprises from 1998 to 2003, we test the predictions of the political patronage theory regarding the causes of privatization. We find that privatization is less likely for those collectively owned enterprises that offer higher political benefits to governments＇ officials, have more reliance on governments for inputs and sales, and enjoy relatively higher positions in the local economy, lending strong support to the political patronage theory and have implications for policy making and implementation.

关 键 词：政治庇护 集体企业 转轨经济 企业改制 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理]