企业员工培训投资博弈分析  

An Analysis of Investment Game in Corporation's HR Training

作　　者：解百臣[1] 吴育华[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第3期97-100,共4页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(06JC880012)

摘　　要：大多数企业对职工培训资金的拨付、培训项目的安排都采取部门申报、领导审批的方式,经常会造成培训资金不足、使用不当和效率低下的情况。在借鉴人力资本投资收益率计算方法的基础上,运用博弈论分析了知识员工培训资金分配的最佳状态,探讨了采用这种方法时可能出现的分离均衡、混同均衡和杂交均衡,以及推进状态之间的转换的方法。该理论对于确定培训资金数量、调动员工参与培训的积极性、提高培训效率等具有积极意义。Most enterprises appropriate the money for their HR training funds and projects according to the department＇s plan and the direetor＇s decision, which always leads to the deficiency of their HR training funds, the improper use of them, and its low efficiency. By innovatively integrating the known method of returns to HR capital investment with the game theory, this problem can be solved successfully. Furthermore, detail analysis was given for the possible separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium, cross equilibrium as well as the transfer of different states. This approach can greatly benefit the allotment of training funds, mobilize the employees＇enthusiasm, and increase the training efficiency.

关 键 词：培训资金 投资博弈 分离均衡 混同均衡 半分离均衡 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]