多元化战略与管理保护:基于中国上市公司进入新行业的视角  

Diversification and Managerial Entrenchment:Based on Diversified Entry of Listed Companies in China

作　　者：艾健明[1] 柯大钢[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理评论》2007年第4期29-34,62,共7页Management Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金项目资助(05JA790022)。

摘　　要：本文从中国上市公司进入新行业这一全新视角检验了管理能力假说与管理保护假说。结果显示,进入新行业前后企业平均绩效水平显著下降,资产规模显著上升,多元化程度、管理报酬均与资产规模显著正相关,且总经理更替与资产规模显著负相关,但没有发现管理报酬与多元化程度之间显著相关性的证据。因此,结论否定管理能力假说,支持管理保护假说,表明我国上市公司进入新行业是过度投资的一种表现。The paper tests the hypotheses of managerial entrenchment and managerial abilities based on diversifying entry of listed companies in China. The results show that corporate performances decrease and corporate size increase after diversifying entry; the degree of diversification and managerial compensation are positively related to corporate size significantly;managerial replacement is negatively related to corporate size significantly, but the relationship between managerial compensation and degree of diversification has no significance. Therefore, the results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis and deny managerial ability hypothesis. Diversifying entry of listed companies is a reflection of overinvestment.

关 键 词：多元化战略 管理保护 管理能力 进入新行业 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]