基于声誉信息效应的战略伙伴逆向选择抑制研究  

Study on the Control of Adverse Selection from Strategic Partners Based on the Information Effect of Reputation

作　　者：徐金发[1] 符加林[1] 黄晓红[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,杭州310027

出　　处：《技术经济》2007年第6期1-5,共5页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70672045)

摘　　要：企业声誉传递了企业内在特征信息,能为潜在的战略伙伴提供有效的识别信号,从而抑制战略联盟伙伴的逆向选择。本文将声誉引入信号传递博弈模型,证明在声誉成本函数下,声誉信号可以使该博弈产生一个分离均衡,由此分析阐释了联盟企业可以利用声誉信号识别战略伙伴的机理与过程。Corporate reputation transmits the information of the corporate inherent attributes, so it can provide effective discrimination signal for those potential strategic partners, and thus to control the adverse selection from strategic alliance partners. This paper introduces reputation into the signaling game model, and testifies that reputation signal brings the game with a separate equilibrium under the condition of reputation cost function. Then, we explain the mechanism and process that the alliance companies discriminate strategic partners by reputation signal.

关 键 词：声誉信息效应 战略伙伴 逆向选择 信号传递博弈 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]