具有产品回收的闭环供应链协调模型  

Coordination Model for Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Recycling

作　　者：邱若臻[1] 黄小原[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第6期883-886,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项基金资助项目(20050145022);辽宁省科学技术计划项目(2004401015)

摘　　要：研究了随机需求下具有产品回收的闭环供应链协调问题.综合考虑制造商和销售商同时负责产品回收两种渠道,建立了以制造商为主方,销售商为从方的闭环供应链Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出了分散决策下的Stackelberg均衡对策;分析了同集中决策之间的关系;探讨了闭环供应链渠道协调策略存在的可能性;最后结合家电废旧产品回收问题进行了仿真计算.研究表明,通过简单的“两部收费制”契约,可以在保证供应链成员利润基础上实现闭环供应链渠道协调.The coordination of closed-loop supply demand is studied, Two recycling channels covering chain with product recycling in stochastic both manufactures and sellers are considered to develop a Stackelberg game model for closed-loop supply chain where the manufacturers and sellers play the roles of leader and follower, respectively. The Stackelberg equilibrium game is proposed on a basis of decentralized decision which is discussed in relation to centralized decision. The possibility of the existence of a coordinative strategy is also discussed for closed-loop supply chain. A simulation was therefore carried out for the recycling of household electrical appliances as junk. The result showed that a two-part tariff contract signed by both parties can simply make the closed-loop supply chain coordinative so as to ensure that both manufacturers and sellers in the supply chain gain their own rational profits.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 产品回收 协调 Stackelberg对策 契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]