营销渠道战略联盟形成的博弈分析  

Formation of Marketing Channel Strategic Alliance from Game Model Analysis

作　　者：陈洁[1] 吕巍[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第1期65-68,73,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70302017)

摘　　要：首先运用囚徒困境模型的静态分析和蜈蚣博弈模型分析渠道联盟不能形成的原因。结果表明,由于渠道成员双方的不信任使得营销渠道战略联盟形成的理论意义大于实践,但是,由于重复协议和不断学习的效应导致渠道双方能明确地意识到联盟的利益所在,因此,渠道成员双方运用协商机制有助于形成联盟,此时,蜈蚣博弈均衡将发生变化,共赢的局面将会形成。营销渠道联盟形成动因在于:预先信号传递促进联盟的形成;相对感知公平的收益巩固联盟形成;建立惩罚机制保障渠道联盟形成。Using the prisoner dilemma model and centipede game model, this paper discuss the reason why the formation of marketing channel strategic alliance could not be realized. The results show that the theory meaning of the formation of marketing channel strategic alliance is greater than the practice because of the distrust of both sides of channel participants. Because of the repeated negotiation and learning effect make both sides can definitely realize the profit of alliance, the use of negotiation mechanism between channel participants is helpful to the formation of alliance. The equilibrium of centipede game will change and win-win will be realized. The formation factors of the marketing channel strategic alliance indude., advanced signal facilitates the formation of alliance, the perceived fairness strengthens pay-off the formation of alliance and the establishment of punish mechanism ensures the formation of alliance.

关 键 词：蜈蚣博弈模型 营销渠道 战略联盟 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]