关联交易与公司治理机制  

Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance Mechanisms

作　　者：高雷[1] 宋顺林[1] 

机构地区：[1]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2007年第4期59-65,共7页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"政府治理对国有企业绩效的影响"(70602026);国家社会科学基金项目"控制权转移与公司业绩"(05CJY009);香港特区政府研究资助局项目"所有权结构与公司治理"(CUHK4437/04H);中国博士后科研基金项目"机构投资者持股;掏空与关联交易"(20060400690)

摘　　要：由于公司治理水平低,我国上市公司的控股股东利用关联交易掏空公司的情况非常严重。通过实证分析发现:第一大股东持股比例与关联交易的发生概率呈倒U型关系;股权制衡度与关联交易的发生概率显著负相关;隶属于企业集团增加了关联交易的发生概率;董事会效率、信息披露透明度与关联交易的发生概率无显著关系。Due to the low level of corporate governance,tunneling by listed companies' controlling shareholders through related party transactions is very serious in China.However,the empirical study on related party transactions and corporate governance mechanisms still lacks in China.This research paper tests the relationship between the occurrence probability of related party transactions and corporate governance mechanisms.We have reached the following conclusions: there is a reverse U relationship between the share ratio of the biggest stockholder and the occurrence probability of related party transactions;more balanced ownership structure leads to significantly less related party transactions;listed companies of business groups have more related party transactions;and the efficiency of the board of directors and the transparency of information disclosure do not bear any significant relation with the occurrence probability of related party transactions.The empirical results of this paper can contribute to the reformation of corporate governance and investor protection in China.

关 键 词：关联交易 掏空 公司治理 股权结构 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]