上市公司管理舞弊的治理——基于管理层报酬契约设计分析  

Management Fraud of Listed Companies Improvement——Based on managerial compensation contracts design analysis

作　　者：周密[1] 唐浩[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第4期35-40,共6页Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences

摘　　要：管理舞弊作为管理层追求机会主义而实施的欺诈性行为,它与管理报酬契约的天然不完备性、业绩评价指标的缺陷性及管理报酬契约的隐性激励有很大关系。我国的管理报酬虽然连年大幅度增长,但一直存在着管理报酬结构单一、管理报酬与业绩相关性差、缺乏长期显性激励等缺陷,导致管理舞弊案件频繁发生。所以可以考虑完善在报酬契约中加入对高管实现公司长期发展目标的考核,并使考核结果能在当年年度报酬中得到反映这样一种隐性长期激励形式。Management fraud as the fraudulent acts of the manager to pursue opportunistic, which is related to the natural incomplete of managerial compensation contracts, limitation of the performance evaluation index and management and the hidden incentive of the managerial compensation. Although our managerial compensation grow fast these years, but there still have many limitation such as managerial compensation structure is single and the poor relation between management performance - and compensation, lack of long - term dominant incentive, etc. So management fraud still frequenly happen. Therefore, in term of manager to realize the object inspection of company development for a long time ,we may consider to write it in the managerial compensation contract . And inspected the result to be able to reflect this kind of long - term hidden incentive form in the same year year reward.

关 键 词：管理舞弊 管理报酬契约 舞弊动机 显性激励 隐性激励 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]