上市公司监事会特征及其经营绩效实证分析  

Supervisory Board Characteristics and Performance at Listed Companies: An Empirical Analysis

作　　者：石水平[1] 林斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632 [2]中山大学会计学系,广东广州510275

出　　处：《贵州财经学院学报》2007年第4期73-76,共4页Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国家族企业信息传递机制研究"(70572064);广东省自然科学基金项目"我国上市公司监事会特征;治理效果及其动因研究"(05003279)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：通过对我国中小企业板块上市公司监事会特征和经营绩效进行实证分析后发现:监事会规模几乎不能影响公司的发展态势,监事持股比例、年度报酬与上市公司经营绩效不存在显著的正相关关系。我们认为,在某种程度上,正是经理阶层的强势地位使得监事会处于弱势。但随着职业经理层的兴起以及机构投资者队伍的扩大和实力的增强,将会有力地改善监事会的这种"跛脚地位"。This paper makes an empirical analysis of supervisory board characteristics and performance of small and medium - sized listed companies. It is found that the scale of supervisory board can hardly affect the development of the companies, and that there is no significant positive correlation between shares held by and annum compensation of supervisors and company performance. We believe that, to some extent, it is the advantageous status of the management that has put supervisory board at a disadvantage. With the rise of professional managers and the expansion and growth of institutional investors, however, the “disadvantageous status” of supervisory board will be greatly improved.

关 键 词：监事会特征 持股比例 年度报酬 经营绩效 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]