过度自信对经理业绩分享系数与风险之间关系的影响  

Pay Performance Sensitivity and Risk:The Impact of Managerial Overconfidence

作　　者：周嘉南[1] 黄登仕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第3期269-274,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70572089);国家杰出青年科学基金(70229001)

摘　　要：经典的代理理论证明了经理报酬中的最优业绩分享系数与风险成反比。然而许多关于薪酬与风险的实证和实验的研究却提供了与之相反的证据。从理论上探讨当经理过度自信时最优的业绩分享系数与风险之间的关系。模型表明,当经理过度自信的系数较大时,尽管经理是风险厌恶的,最优的业绩分享系数在风险较大的区间内却是随着风险的增加而上升,而在风险较小的区间内则是随着风险的增加而下降;而且随着经理过度自信系数的加大,经理付出的最优努力水平也将随着风险的增加而增加。The trade-off between incentive and risk is of great importance in general principal-agent model. However, the empirical evidences about incentive and risk are ambiguous, and some of them even support a reverse relationship. Thus, this study intends to explore the impact of the managerial overconfidence on the relation between the pay performance sensitivity and risk. The result of our model indicates that although the manager is risk-averse, the optimal pay performance sensitivity will be increasing in the higher risk region, and will be decreasing in the lower risk region when the manager＇s effort-averse coefficient and overconfidence coefficient are under a certain condition. In addition, when the manager is more overconfident, the optimal effort is also increasing in the risk. Our model expands the general principal-agent model and gives some useful empirical implication on the incentive design.

关 键 词：业绩分享系数 过度自信 风险 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]