具有退货政策的制造-零售供应链最优策略  

Optimal Decision for Manufacturing-Retailing Supply Chain Using Returns Policy

作　　者：唐建勋[1] 张薇[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第8期1209-1212,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(10371013)

摘　　要：研究实行退货政策的制造-零售供应链系统的协调问题.对于单一制造商与单一零售商,首先建立起一个市场需求量为零售价格线性减函数的基于Stackelberg博弈框架的可退货供应链博弈模型,并对其进行了合作与非合作博弈的最优决策分析.基于带有退货政策的报童模型,建立起市场需求量受随机干扰的可退货的供应链博弈模型,并研究其系统协调问题,给出了制造商和零售商在非合作博弈时各自达到最优利润的最优决策和在合作博弈时系统利润达到最优的最优决策.最后,分析采取退货政策的条件,给出了它的有效域.The coordination is studied for a single manufacturing-retailing supply chain as a system with returns policy warranted. Based on the frame of Stackelberg game, a gaming model is developed for such a supply chain system to which the market demand is supposed to be a linear decreasing function of retail price. Then, a newsboy model is developed by analyzing the optimal decisions in view of both the cooperation and non-cooperation, as well as a gaming model to reflect how the randomly disturbed market demand affects the supply chain with the coordination involved In such a way the optimal decisions are given taking account of either the noncooperation under which both the manufacturer and retailer can maximizing their profits or the cooperation under which the system can obtain optimal profit. Analyzing the conditions for using returns policy, the effective range is given.

关 键 词：供应链协调 退货政策 报童模型 随机退货模型 合作与非合作博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]