基于关系契约的研发联盟收益分配问题  

Profit-sharing of research and development alliances based on relational contracts

作　　者：王安宇[1] 司春林[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《东南大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第4期700-705,共6页Journal of Southeast University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502010)

摘　　要：在关系契约框架下研究研发联盟的收益分配问题.结果表明,研发联盟一次性合作的收益分配方案应遵循绝对优势原则,即合作各方应能够得到与自身贡献相匹配的合理收益;而重复合作收益分配应遵循相对优势原则,即根据相对成本和相对效率确定收益分配率,应给予相对劣势成员比短期合作中更高的收益分配比例,虽然该比例仍低于相对优势成员.这些研究结论可用来修正研发联盟收益分配正式契约条款,有助于克服成员的背约冲动,维护研发联盟的长期稳定.The profit-sharing problem of research and development alliances in the framework of relational contracts is discussed. The first finding is that partners in one-off cooperation should get reasonable amount of profit in proportion to their own contribution to the alliance, which is called the absolute advantage principle. And as for the repeated cooperation, the profit-sharing scheme should follow the comparative advantage principle in which the sharing rate is determined by the comparing result of relative cost and relative effectiveness. According to the principle, the relatively disadvantaged members should be given a higher sharing rate than they can get in one-off cooperation, although the rate is still lower than what the advantaged would get. Following these principles can prevent members from breaking the cooperative agreement and do benefit to the stability of the alliance.

关 键 词：研发联盟 关系契约 绝对优势 相对优势 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]