具有双曲需求无成本协同效应的横向兼并分析  

THE ANALYSIS OF THE MULTI-OLIGARCHS NONLINEAR HORIZONTAL MERGER BEHAVIORS WITHOUT COST SYNERGY

作　　者：刘新民[1] 高珦琇[2] 王本锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266510 [2]山东科技大学信息科学与工程学院,山东青岛266510

出　　处：《山东师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第3期14-17,共4页Journal of Shandong Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：山东省中青年科学家科研奖励基金:企业家选择的指标体系研究(2005BS10005)子课题

摘　　要：基于具有直角双曲需求函数的寡头垄断竞争行业,研究了企业横向兼并是否有利可图问题.证明了在直角双曲需求函数以及企业兼并成垄断被排除的情况下,若兼并的企业在其内部实施两阶段错开的斯塔克伯格竞争,并且兼并企业与未参与兼并的企业之间进行古诺竞争,则一次先置兼并的行为会使未参与兼并的企业受损,尽管成为兼并企业领头部门虽然有利可图,但是对于兼并后的整个企业则显得无利可图,并且这种兼并将不会引发进行作为局外人企业的系列兼并行为.所得结论与在线性需求函数条件下的结论相反.Research on whether the entreprise can make a profit in the profession participates according to the condition that in the multi - oligarchs Coumot model of non - linear demand function condition of the right angle hyperbolic is given. Under the situation of multi - oligarchs Coumot model of non - linear demand function condition of the right angle hyperbolic, if annexes the enterprise implements the two stages stagger competition in its internal, and the annexation enterprise compete with the enterprise which has not participated in the annexation, the behavior of a preemptive merger will cause the annexation enterprise damage. While the lead department of the annexation enterprise can be profitable, the entire annexation enterprise has no benefits to be gained. And under this condition, it will not be able to cause the outsider enterprise to carry on a series of annexation behavior. The obtained conclusion is opposite to the conclusion under the linear demand function condition.

关 键 词：横向兼并 成本协同效应 古诺竞争 斯塔克伯格竞争 

分 类 号：O29[理学—应用数学]