监察合谋:惩罚、激励与合谋防范  

Collusion in Supervising:Punishments,Incentives and Collusion-proof Contract

作　　者：董志强[1] 严太华[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第3期94-97,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部高校博士学科点基金资助项目(20020611009)

摘　　要：通过一个P-S-A三层代理硬信息模型来分析公共领域的监察合谋行为,重点考察了有成本的合谋惩罚机制对防合谋合约结构的影响。发现防合谋合约并非如既有文献中那样单纯是让渡租金的问题,而是在监察者激励报酬和惩罚机制之间进行权衡的问题:存在一个临界值,如果反合谋成本系数高于这个值,则对监察者支付激励报酬就是必须的;如果反合谋成本系数低于这个值,则没有必要对监察者支付激励报酬。文章还证明,即便防合谋合约是严格的,它对不知情的委托人来说也是有价值的。This paper analyzes collusive behaviors in supervising in public management fields by using a P-S-A hierarchy agency model with hard information, especially addresses that how the punishments mechanism with costs will influence the structure of collusion-proof contract （ this problem wasn＇t discussed in the past literatures）. We find that collusion-proof contract is not only a problem of transferring information rents, but also a problem of trade-off between incentive compensations and punishments mechanism. There is a critical value, if collusion-proof cost coefficient is greater than the critical value, the incentive compensations must be paid to the watchdog; or otherwise it is unnecessary to pay incentive compensations to the watchdog. The paper also proofs that it is worthy for uninformed principal to implement collusion-proof contract even if it is strict.

关 键 词：监察 组织合谋 防合谋合约 多层级代理 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济] F062.6