基于代理成本视角的企业理论  

Enterprise Theory from the Perspective of Agency Costs

作　　者：李家鸽[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2007年第4期76-81,共6页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：从代理成本的角度分析企业组织是现代企业理论中一个重要的组成部分,为此对西方新制度经济学中的相关研究文献进行了梳理和综述。从企业产权的不完全转让关系出发,指出代理成本是企业组织治理问题中的重要因素,正是对企业委托代理关系的治理推动了不同企业组织结构的创新和演变。所有权和控制权的分离并不必然导致企业经营的无效率或低效率,委托代理关系反映的正是一种在代理成本约束下的有效率的选择。From the perspective of agency costs, the paper analyzes that enterprise organization is an important part of enterprise theory, and a literature review is made on the new institutional economics. Start from the incomplete transfer of enterprise property right, the author argues that agency cost is an important factor in the management of enterprise which promoted the change of organizational structures. The separate of ownership and management is not necessarily leads to inefficiency or low efficiency of enterprises, and procuratorial relationship reflects an effective choice under the restriction of agency cost.

关 键 词：代理成本 企业组织 委托代理 所有权 控制权 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]