上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究  

Empirical Research on Over-investment Behavior and its Restriction Systems in China's Listed Companies

作　　者：唐雪松[1] 周晓苏[2] 马如静[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,610074 [2]南开大学商学院,300071 [3]南开大学经济学院,300071

出　　处：《会计研究》2007年第7期44-52,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70472051)资助

摘　　要：经理的机会主义引发企业过度投资行为,西方学者通过考察投资现金流相关性研究企业过度投资问题并找到相应经验证据。利用上市公司(2000—2002)数据研究上市公司是否存在过度投资行为以及相关制约机制是否有效,结果表明,(1)我国上市公司存在过度投资行为;(2)现金股利、举借债务是过度投资行为的有效制约机制;(3)公司治理机制在制约过度投资行为中基本有效,但是,独立董事并未发挥作用。Manager's opportunism leads to over-investment behavior.By using investment-cash flow sensitivity,western scholars have found empirical evidences on over-investment behavior.Using data from 2000 to 2002,we identify over-investment behavior and corresponding restriction systems in China's listed companies.The results show that,firstly,there are over-investment behaviors in China's listed companies.secondly,cash dividends and liabilities are effective restriction systems on over-investment behavior.thirdly,in general,corporate governance can restrict over-investment behavior,but independent directors have no effects on over-investment behavior.The results are important to our modern corporate institutions.

关 键 词：过度投资 制约机制 自由现金流代理问题 上市公司 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理]