终极控制权性质与公司绩效——基于配对样本的实证检验  

Property of Ultimate Control Right and Corporate Performance——Based on an Empirical test of Paired Samples

作　　者：崔学刚[1] 谢志华[1] 郑职权[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学,北京100037

出　　处：《财贸研究》2007年第4期104-111,共8页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"完善国有资本预算经营制度研究"(项目编号:06BJY014);北京市教委人文社科项目"中小企业融资策略与风险价值管理研究"(项目编号:SM200610011002);北京市教委拔尖人才项目"国有企业经营管理者激励与约束机制研究"的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文基于终极控制权理论考察终极控制权性质对公司绩效的影响。研究发现:在非保护性行业中,在控制公司规模、行业、上市地点、财务杠杆、治理因素以及上年度业绩的情况下,民营终极控制权的上市公司业绩显著高于非民营上市公司。在保护性行业中,国有控制权与民营控制权对公司业绩的影响无显著差异。本文提供了终极控制权性质与公司绩效的系统性经验证据,对于继续进行民营化改革的政策制定与监管具有一定的参考价值。Based on the ultimate control right theory, this paper makes a comparison between the efficiencies of the two properties from various perspectives. This research finds out, in unprotected industries, the efficiency of private-owned is overwhelmingly higher than the state -owned, on condition that the company size, industries, location of listing, financial leverage, governance factors and last year＇s performance are controlled. In the protected industries, efficiencies of the two show no significant differences. The protection of the government＇s policies and favorable conditions in numerous aspects may hide the low-efficiency of state-owned properties to some extent. This paper supplies systematical empirical evidence for making policies as well as supervision and management in further reforms of privatization.

关 键 词：民营控制 国有控制 终极控制人 配对样本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]