风险投资声誉激励机制下的相对业绩比较  

The Reputation Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Investment under Relative Performance Evaluation

作　　者：艾耕云[1] 徐晋[1] 余祎[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]浙江工业大学化学工程与材料学院,杭州310014

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2007年第7期1134-1137,共4页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172001)

摘　　要：为了研究声誉激励机制下的相对业绩比较(RPE)对风险企业家行为的影响,改进了风险企业产出函数,并构造博弈模型,分别对存在与不存在相对业绩比较两种情形展开讨论,给出了相对业绩比较促使风险企业家的努力程度得到帕累托改进的基本条件.研究表明,声誉激励机制下,相对业绩比较有利于解决风险投资家与风险企业家之间的信息不对称问题,对完善投资契约具有积极的指导作用.In order to study the effect of relative performance evaluation on behavior of venture entrepre- neur under reputation incentive mechanism of venture capital investment, the product function of venture firms was improved, and dynamic game models were constructed. By discussing the static and dynamic relative performance evaluation of venture entrepreneurs, the Pareto postulate of effort improving was given. The analysis shows that under reputation incentive mechanism, relative performance evaluation could supervise the problem solving of asymmetric information and contract implementation between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs.

关 键 词：风险投资 声誉激励 相对业绩比较 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理]