基于双重委托代理模型的国有上市公司治理机制研究  

The Governance Mechanism for Chinese Listed Companies' Based on Double Principal-Agent Model HuiWang

作　　者：王辉[1] 严广乐[1] 李霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《商业研究》2007年第9期18-21,共4页Commercial Research

基　　金：基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目;项目编号:70371070;上海市重点学科建设项目;项目编号:T0502。

摘　　要：我国上市公司的多重股权结构的存在使得上市公司中不同类型的股东之间的利益、目标有很大差异甚至冲突,传统的单一委托代理模型对上市公司并不是很适用,所以采用双重委托代理模型更有利于设计最优的治理结构和治理机制,降低代理成本,有效控制控股股东或大股东恶意侵害中小股东利益的程度,缓和委托人之间的目标冲突,尽力实现全体股东的利益最大化。Due to the existence of the multiply equity ownership in Chinese listed companies, different types of shareholders have differences and conflicts in their aims and interest. Therefore, the conventional single principle - agent model is not fit for Chinese listed companies. So, in this paper double principle - agent model is employed to design the optimum governance structure and mechanism to reduce the agency costs of companies, control the proportion of small shareholders＇interest which is seized on by big shareholders, mediate the conflicts between the principles. It aims at realizin,, the maximal interset of all stockholders.

关 键 词：双重委托代理模型 股权结构 效用函数 机制治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]