降低代理成本——公司治理结构设计的效率原则  

Reduce Agency Cost:the Efficiency Principle of the Design of Corporate Governance Structure

作　　者：张付成[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学法学院,河南郑州450052

出　　处：《河南社会科学》2007年第5期67-68,共2页Henan Social Sciences

摘　　要：基于公司所有权与经营权的分离,产生了委托代理关系。由于信息不对称、目标偏差、败德行为和逆向选择及"搭便车"等代理人问题的存在,代理成本就无法避免。公司治理结构是为了解决代理成本问题而出现的,因此,公司治理结构的设计必须以效率为原则,通过激励和约束机制及监督机制来降低代理成本,以实现所有者和经营者的平衡。Based on the separation of ownership from managerial authority, the agency relationship emerges. But the agency cost can not be avoided as there exist problems involving agents’ asymmetrical information, deviation of target, immoral behavior, reversed choice and so on. To solve the problem, the corporate governance structure is needed. The design of this structure should take efficiency as its principle, aiming at reducing agency cost and achieving the balance between owner and manager, by means of incitement and restraint mechanisms and supervision mechanisms.

关 键 词：代理成本 公司治理结构 效率 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]