外资驱动行业重组的动机和社会福利效应分析  

Research on incentives and the welfare effects of the mergers driven by the foreign capital

作　　者：郑迎飞[1] 陈宏民[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外贸易学院,上海201620 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2007年第4期419-425,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372057)

摘　　要：国内大型企业引进外资,进而借力收购中小企业,最终在国内形成了一系列由外资驱动的行业重组.针对这一现象,采用Cournot垄断竞争模型,分析并购活动中所有权和资产二者不同程度转移的动机及对产业结构和社会福利的影响.结论认为:大企业引进外资及其协同效应的提高增加社会福利,但中小企业有动机以更高的成本引进外资.大企业以股权收购方式收购小企业提高社会福利,但大企业之间相互持股降低社会福利.大企业之间现金收购外部效应为正,小企业之间现金收购的外部效应为负.Domestic big enterprises absorb foreign capital, and then acquire other small and medium enterprises（SMEs）. It forms a series of mergers and acquisitions （M＆As） in an industry. A Cournot＇ s model is built to analyze the industry organization and the social effects of the M＆As according to the transferring of the ownership and the assets. Conclusions： Big enterprises absorbing foreign capitals and their synergy improve the welfare, but the SMEs have incentives to absorbing foreign capitals at higher cost. A big enterprise acquires some stock of a small enterprise improve the welfare, but opposite between big enterprises. The external effect of acquisitions by cash between big enterprises is positive, but negative between small ones.

关 键 词：重组 外资 动机 社会福利 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]