银企关系与代理冲突:基于日本上市企业现金持有量的经验证据  

Bank-firm Relations and Agency Conflicts:Evidence Based on the Cash Holdings of Japanese Listed Firms

作　　者：罗琦[1] 邹斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《预测》2007年第5期48-54,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：中国博士后科学研究基金面上资助项目(20070410287);教育部回国留学人员科研启动基金资助项目(教外司留[2007]24号);华中科技大学校科学研究基金资助项目(2006Q028A)

摘　　要：本文以东京证券交易所上市企业为分析样本,通过实证检验银企关系、企业现金持有量、企业价值三者之间的关系,考察银行在日本企业治理结构中所发挥的作用。我们发现,与银行关系密切的企业持有的现金水平较低,但是有些企业因过度借贷而持有较多的现金。结果还显示,企业与银行关系越密切,企业价值受损越严重。本文结果表明,日本银企关系具有两重性,与银行关系密切的企业获得了融资便利,但同时要遭受企业经营者与银行股东串谋所导致的代理成本。本文研究为建立我国新型银企关系提供了有益的借鉴。This paper tests two views of bank＇ s role for Japanese firms. The views are confronted with the empirical evidence, allowing them to compete to explain firm＇ s cash holding decisions and the implication of cash holdings on firm value. We find that firms with closer bank relations hold less cash, but some of them are over-borrowing. We discover that cash holdings cause more severe agency conflicts for the firms who have the closer relations with the banks, Our resuits show that banks do not monitor their client firms and are unlikely to push the managers of the firms to take efficient actions on maximizing firm value. This research shed light on the importance to improve the Chinese bank-firm relations.

关 键 词：银企关系 代理冲突 现金持有量 企业价值 日本 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]