技术标准联盟组建中专利许可交易的逆向选择  

The Adverse Selection about the Trade of Patent under the Technical Standards Alliances Construction

作　　者：朱丹[1] 曾德明[1] 彭盾[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《系统工程》2007年第8期84-88,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(7031010704570572058);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20040532001)

摘　　要：标准竞争成为一种新形势的竞争,企业努力使自己的专利技术写入标准之中。为此专利持有者要向技术标准联盟申请专利许可,由于信息不对称,造成"逆向选择"问题的出现。文章首先对这种现象进行深入分析,并指出"逆向选择"导致的三种后果。为解决这个问题,文章随后借助于信号传递博弈模型。得出以下结论:专利持有者在向联盟申报专利之前,邀请相关专家对专利技术进行认定,可以避免信息不对称对双方造成的损失。The standards competition becomes one new kind of competition, an enterprise want to have its own patent technology taken to the standards. So patent owner should apply for patent holders from technical standards alliances. But the information is asymmetrical, creates ＂adverse selection＂ the question appearance. The article first carried on the thorough analysis to this kind of phenomenon, and pointed out ＂ adverse selection ＂ causes three kind of consequences. In order to solve this problem, the article afterwards drew support from the signaling games. Conclusion is： Patent holders should have their patent checked by experts. Thus, may avoid the loss, which the information asymmetrically created, to both sides.

关 键 词：技术标准联盟 逆向选择 信号传递博弈 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F279[经济管理—企业管理]