大股东控制对资产替代及资本结构的影响  

Impact of Large Shareholders Control to Asset Substitution and Capital Structure

作　　者：江伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学会计系,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2007年第9期68-73,共6页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70372033);暨南大学人文社会科学发展基金项目(006JSYJ041)的资助

摘　　要：在债权人的法律保护以及自我保护都比较弱的情况下,大股东会选择很高的负债比率进行资产替代,从而侵害债权人的利益。大股东的持股比例、公司类别以及债务期限结构都会对大股东选择很高的负债比率进行资产替代的行为产生影响。This paper examines the capital structure decisions taken by large shareholders in Chinese listed firms to carry out the behavior of asset substitution.The empirical results show that,under the weak creditor protection by law and self-protection,large shareholders will choose higher capital structure to take asset substitution,through which to expropriate the interests of creditors.What＇ more,the shares held by large shareholders,the firms＇ nature and debt maturity structure can all have effect on the capital structure decisions taken by large shareholders through which to take asset substitution.

关 键 词：大股东控制 资产替代 资本结构 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]