地区间人才流动政策的博弈分析  

A Game-Based Analysis on Inter-regional Policy of Talent Flow

作　　者：陆卫江[1] 李仕明[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第4期395-400,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(2005614001)

摘　　要：运用静态博弈理论分析地区间人才流动政策的决策问题。通过对不同地区、不同行业间的人才流动行为分析,建立了以生产力最大化为决策目标的地区间人才流动政策博弈模型,证明了人才流动博弈纳什均衡的存在性和惟一性。结果表明:在给定资本投资的条件下,地区间人才流动性越高,投资于教育的人口比例会越高,从而提高每个地区的生产力。但是,除一种特殊情况(人才流动政策均具有正的净效应)外,地区间人才流动政策的非合作博弈不能实现最优的帕累托效率。The problem of making inter-regional talent policy is studied within the theoretical framework of static games. By analyzing the inter-regional talent flows with industrial differences of productivity, this paper, based on the objective of regional productivity maximization, builds a game model on making interregional talent policy and proves that there is one and only one Nash equilibrium of policy-making game. The results show that given capital stock, the higher the inter-regional mobility, the higher percentage of the population who make their investments in education, whereby the productivity of each （regional） economy would be improved. However, the Pareto efficiency can not be realized through a non-cooperative game of inter-regional talent policy-making, unless the talent policy of each economy have positive net effect on the accumulation of human capital via education.

关 键 词：人才流动 政策 博弈 

分 类 号：C962[经济管理—人力资源管理]